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SHEDDING TIERS:
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
DANIELLE STEFANUCCI†
INTRODUCTION
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of the United States
should reconsider the tiers of scrutiny framework that courts use
to evaluate equal protection claims. The Supreme Court has
recognized government classifications on the bases of race and
gender to be suspect and to merit heightened judicial scrutiny.1
However, any governmental classification among people is subject
to review under the Equal Protection Clause.2 The class itself is
not suspect; the basis for the classification, like race or gender, is
treated by courts as more or less suspect.
†

Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2017, Boston College. Thank you to Professor John Q.
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1
Current equal protection jurisprudence functions as a three-tiered framework:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Strict scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling
interest achieved using the least restrictive means; it is applied to classifications on
the basis of race, national origin, and alienage—or when a fundamental interest is
implicated—and the burden of proof is on the government to prove the classification
is proper. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016); Crawford v.
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967). Intermediate scrutiny requires the law substantially further an important
governmental objective; it is applied to classifications on the basis of sex—where the
government must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification”—and nonmarital
child status, and the burden of proof is on the government to prove the classification
is proper. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689–90 (2017);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). Finally, rational basis review requires
that the law is rationally related to a cognizable legislative objective; it is applied to
classifications on any basis not found to merit heightened scrutiny, and the burden of
proof is on the challenger to prove the classification is invalid. See, e.g., Armour v. City
of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 676 (2012); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955).
2
The equal protection guarantee also applies to the federal government through
the liberty guarantee of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954)).
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However, employing the tiers of scrutiny no longer makes
sense in an era when traditional understandings of race and
gender continue to break down. Relatedly, it is time to reassess
the current jurisprudential approach because the Supreme Court
has frequently failed to adhere to the tiers of scrutiny framework
it has articulated.3 Part I of this Note discusses the breakdown of
race and gender as definable and cognizable classes, relying
on social science evidence-based understandings of these
classifications. Section I.A focuses on the current understanding
of gender and contemplates the ramifications of this change on
equal protection jurisprudence. Section I.B undertakes the same
analysis for race.
Part II suggests a new framework for how equal protection
jurisprudence should function in light of these scientific and
epistemological changes. In employing this framework, a court
considering an equal protection claim would balance the
government interest against the individual interest on a
case-by-case basis. This approach would change equal protection
analysis at all levels of the judiciary: in state courts, federal
district courts, circuit courts, and at the Supreme Court.
Part III justifies this new framework as a more egalitarian
way to undertake equal protection analysis because it allows a
court to consider each case’s unique factual circumstances, while
still operating within the bounds of established constitutional
principles. Part IV applies the suggested framework to two
cases—one retrospective and one prospective. The retrospective
case focuses on a classification on the basis of age and mirrors the

3

For cases where laws were struck down under rational basis review, see, for
example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982); U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973). For arguments that
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence resembles strict scrutiny, see United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 579 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This
unacknowledged adoption of what amounts to (at least) strict scrutiny is without
antecedent in our sex-discrimination cases and by itself discredits the Court’s
decision.”). For cases where laws were upheld under a strict scrutiny framework, see
Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2208; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). While this failure to comply with existing
jurisprudence also underscores the need for a new framework, it is not the focus of
this Note.
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facts of Massachusetts v. Murgia.4 The prospective case focuses on
the United States’s military ban on transgender individuals and
mirrors the facts of Karnoski v. Trump.5
I.
A.

THE BREAKDOWN OF CLASSIFICATIONS

Gender

In a series of cases litigated in the 1970s, the Supreme Court
recognized government classifications on the basis of sex as
suspect and meriting increased judicial scrutiny.6 In establishing
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of scrutiny, the
Court employed the terms sex and gender interchangeably.7 At
that time, the conception of sex—both in society and among the
Supreme Court justices—was binary: male and female.8
Additionally, the language of the opinions acknowledged the
existence of biological differences between men and women.9
Based on these innate disparities, the justices concluded that
sex-based classifications are not always arbitrary, which formed
the central argument for why sex-based classifications only merit
4

427 U.S. 307, 308 (1976).
No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
Plaintiffs alleged that President Donald Trump’s ban on transgender individuals
serving in the military violates the Equal Protection Clause, substantive due
process notions, and the First Amendment. Id. at *4. This Note focuses on the equal
protection claim.
6
In Reed v. Reed, decided in 1971, the Court struck down a law classifying on the
basis of sex for the first time, albeit under rational basis review. 404 U.S. 71, 76–77
(1971). In Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973, sex-based classifications failed to
receive five votes to warrant strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973). The Court
decided on intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of scrutiny in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976).
7
Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (“Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees
does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation
of drinking and driving. In fact . . . the relationship between gender and traffic safety
becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed’s requirement that the gender-based difference
be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective.”) (emphasis added).
8
GEORGE DVORSKY & JAMES HUGHES, INST. FOR ETHICS AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, POSTGENDERISM: BEYOND THE GENDER BINARY 2 (2008). The
language of the Court’s opinions also reinforces this conception. See Craig, 429 U.S.
at 197 (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are
‘subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’ To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.” (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 75) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added)).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical
differences between men and women, however, are enduring . . . .”).
5
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intermediate scrutiny.10 While some feminist and progressive
scholars distinguished gender from sex and saw gender as a social
construct, this was not the mainstream view at that time.11
Today, scientific scholarship distinguishes between sex and
gender.12 Sex refers to a biological classification, whereas gender
refers to an individual’s self-identity and the social representation
of that identity.13 “One is not born, but rather becomes, a
woman,” such that an individual is born with a biological sex but
must learn feminine or masculine behaviors to accord with
societal expectations.14
Sex, while less complicated than gender, has its own
complexities: male and female are the two principal biological
sexes, but other identities exist as well.15 In terms of chromosomal
makeup, most humans are born with forty-six chromosomes in
twenty-three pairs, and the X and Y chromosomes determine a
person’s sex.16 Therefore, most women manifest as 46XX and
most men as 46XY.17 However, according to the World Health
Organization, some individuals are born with a single sex
chromosome, such as those with Turner syndrome, and others
with three or more sex chromosomes, such as those with
Klinefelter syndrome, among other variations.18 Intersexuality
10
See, e.g., id. (“‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”)
11
See DVORSKY & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 5; see generally ANN OAKLEY, SEX,
GENDER, AND SOCIETY 3 (1972).
12
See, e.g., Joy L. Johnson & Robin Repta, Sex and Gender: Beyond the Binaries,
in DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING GENDER, SEX, AND HEALTH RESEARCH 17, 17 (John
Oliffe & Lorraine Greaves, eds., 2011); Albertine J. Odlehinkel, Editorial: Let’s Talk
About Sex–The Gender Binary Revisited, J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 863, 863
(2017); Britta N. Torgrimson & Christopher T. Minson, Sex and Gender: What is the
Difference?, J. APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY 785, 785–86 (2005), https://www.physiology.org/
doi/full/10.1152/japplphysiol.00376.2005.
13
See, e.g., Johnson & Repta, supra note 12, at 17; Odlehinkel, supra note 12, at
863; Torgrimson & Minson, supra note 12, at 785–86.
14
JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 22 (1994) (quoting SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley trans., 1953)).
15
Gender and Genetics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/genomics/
gender/en/index1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
16
Id.
17
Id. Some females are born 46XY due to mutations in the Y chromosome, and
some males are born 46XX due to a translocation of a section of the Y chromosome. Id.
18
Id. Turner syndrome, which only affects women, occurs when one of the X
chromosomes is missing or partially missing and can lead to a variety of
developmental and medical problems, including short stature and heart defects.
Turner Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/
turner-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20360782 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
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introduces another complication in differentiating among sexes;
the World Health Organization broadly defines intersexuality as
a “congenital anomaly of the reproductive and sexual system.”19
The incidence of intersexuality—while difficult to reliably
approximate—is estimated at between one and two percent of the
global population, but it may be as high as four percent.20
Additionally, scientific scholars no longer consider gender
to be binary, a change which has been reflected in the gender
identity lexicon.21 At its core, gender identity is internal and
self-identified.22
According to the American Psychological
Association, gender identity refers to a “person’s deeply felt,
inherent sense of being a boy, a man, or male; a girl, woman, or
female; or an alternative gender . . . that may or may not
correspond to a person’s sex assigned at birth or to a person’s
primary or secondary sex characteristics.”23 Self-identification
permits a multiplicity of gender identities, including transgender,
gender-fluid,24 agender,25 genderqueer,26 and the umbrella term
Klinefelter syndrome, which only affects men, occurs when there is an extra X
chromosome and can affect puberty and fertility. Klinefelter Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/klinefelter-syndrome/symptomscauses/syc-20353949 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
19
Gender and Genetics, supra note 15.
20
See DVORSKY & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 3. This higher figure for the incidence
of intersexuality reflects a definition including “all genital abnormalities.” Id.; see also
Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes Are There, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29
(claiming John Money, a specialist in congenital sex-organ defects at Johns Hopkins
University, estimates the incidence of intersexual individuals at four percent).
21
See, e.g., Cyndney Adams, The Gender Identity Terms You Need to Know, CBS
NEWS (March 24, 2017, 10:22 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transgendergender-identity-terms-glossary/.
22
American Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with
Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 832,
862 (2015), https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf.
23
Id.
24
The term “gender-fluid,” not added to the Oxford English Dictionary until
2016, is defined as “a person who does not identify with a single fixed gender; of or
relating to a person having or expressing a fluid or unfixed gender identity.”
Noel Gutierrez-Morfin, ‘Gender-Fluid’ Among Recent Additions to Oxford English
Dictionary, NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016, 4:46 P.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/
nbc-out/gender-fluid-among-recent-additions-oxford-english-dictionary-n649571.
25
“Agender” is defined as “[d]esignating a person who does not identify as
belonging to a particular gender; of or relating to such people.” Agender, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/47450702?redirectedFrom=
agender (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
26
“Genderqueer” is defined as “designating a person who does not subscribe to
conventional gender distinctions, but identifies with neither, both, or a combination
of male and female genders”; according to the OED, “Genderqueer is used as neutral
or positive term of self-reference, without regard to, or in implicit denial of, the
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of gender non-binary.27
Transgender identity encompasses
individuals “whose sense of personal identity and gender does not
correspond to that person’s sex at birth,” and includes, but is not
limited to, those who have undergone gender reassignment
surgery.28 Further, transgender has superseded “transsexual” and
“transvestite” as the socially acceptable term.29
Perhaps driven by sociological and scientific experts,
laypeople have also relaxed their strict conception of gender roles.
In the 1970s, the popular stereotype was that women ought to be
wives and mothers.30 This was reflected in the female labor force
participation rate, which was between forty-two and fifty percent,
compared to around fifty-six percent today.31 In the early 1970s,
only fifteen to twenty members of the House of Representatives
and one or two Senators were women; consequently, women were
unable to remedy discrimination against them from inside the
political process.32 The 116th Congress, elected in the 2018
midterm elections, has 126 female representatives out of a total of
535 representatives.33 The House of Representatives also boasts a
record number of women, with 100 female representatives—
thirty-five newly elected, sixty-five incumbent—compared to a
previous high of eighty-five.34

original negative connotations of QUEER.” Gender, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/77468?redirectedFrom=genderqueer#eid237081402
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
27
Adams, supra note 21 (“Non-binary: Any gender that falls outside of the binary
system of male/female or man/woman.”).
28
Transgender, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view
dictionaryentry/Entry/247649 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
29
A Guide to Transgender Terms, BBC MAGAZINE (June 3, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32979297.
30
See, e.g., Kristin Donnelly, et al., Attitudes Towards Women’s Work and Family
Roles in the United States, 1976-2013, PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 41, 41 (2016).
31
International Labor Organization, Labor Force Participation Rate, Female,
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=
US (last visited Oct. 20, 2019); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women at Work: A Visual
Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2003, at 46, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/
10/ressum3.pdf.
32
MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS: 1917-2008 96–97 (2008).
33
Eli Watkins, Record Number of Women Elected to the House, CNN (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/women-house-senate/index.html.
34
Id.
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The development of scientific and lay perceptions reveals
that sex-based classifications frequently rely on antiquated
stereotypes.35 It is reductive to assume that an entire sex has the
same abilities, or inabilities, in any particular area: for example,
a particular woman may be less equipped to be an estate
administrator than a particular man, but the assumption cannot
be made that all men are more equipped than all women for such
a role without individualized determinations.36 In light of
scientific evidence that gender is socialized and has no biological
basis, gender may in fact always be an invalid basis for
classification; by that logic, such a classification would be
precluded even when the distinction relates to biological
differences.
It is more complicated to employ the characteristics that led
to sex-based classifications being deemed suspect in this context of
new gender identity descriptors.37 First, since gender identity is
self-identified rather than based on objective biological criteria,
there are an ostensibly unlimited number of identities.38
Consequently, a legislature, or any other government actor,
cannot reliably define a class with demarcated boundaries,
particularly given that the characteristic may not be visible
because it is the product of an individual’s wholly valid, but
subjective, mental state.39 For example, the transgender military
ban implementation plan excludes from military service both
those “with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria” and those

35

Brief for Appellant at 17, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (“Whatever
differences may exist between the sexes, legislative judgments have frequently been
based on inaccurate stereotypes of the capacities and sensibilities of women.”). This
brief was drafted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg while she was a law professor at Rutgers
Law School, along with Melvin Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).
Ginsburg was the co-founder of the Women’s Rights Project at the ACLU in 1972 and
argued six gender discrimination cases before the Supreme Court between 1973 and
1978. Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/
justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
36
Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 20 (“The result is that the whole class
is relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or
characteristics of its individual members.”).
37
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–89 (1973).
38
See American Psychological Ass’n, supra note 22.
39
Cf., Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 15 (“Both classifications [of race and
gender] create large, natural classes.”); see also American Psychological Ass’n, supra
note 22.
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who “require or have undergone gender transition.”40 This
definition of transgender does not include all those who may
identify as transgender; it attempts to impose a biological
criterion on a self-defined characteristic. Transgender identity, as
understood by the scientific community, requires only gender
identification different from birth sex; consequently, it also
includes individuals who may never have sought treatment for
gender dysphoria and may never undergo hormone therapy or sex
reassignment surgery.41
Second, even if legislatures were able to reliably define classes
based on these new categories, the classes could be based on
non-binary identity generally or transgender identity specifically.
The former defines a class by negative implication: it is not an
affirmatively defined class, but a catchall “other” of those who do
not identify as male or female.42 These imprecise classifications
are at issue in the cases pertaining to transgender servicemembers
in the military and bathroom usage by transgender students.43 In
the latter, certain public schools require individuals to use the
bathroom of the sex to which they were biologically assigned at
birth or lack a defined policy on the issue.44 The Trump
administration, through Department of Health and Human
Services regulations, is also considering amending the legal
definition of sex under Title IX.45 Under the new regulations, sex
would be “either male or female, unchangeable, and determined
by the genitals a person is born with.”46 This classification would
affect not only transgender people, but anyone who identifies as
non-binary, a more expansive category. While Title IX claims are
statutory rather than constitutional, this proposed change in
40

Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 13, 2018).
41
S.C. Meier & C.M. Labuski, The Demographics of the Transgender Population,
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE DEMOGRAPHY OF SEXUALITY 289, 291 (A.K.
Baumle ed. 2013).
42
Non-binary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/non-binary (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“Denoting or relating to a gender or
sexual identity that is not defined in terms of traditional binary oppositions such as
male and female or homosexual and heterosexual.”).
43
See, e.g., Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1; Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 736–37 (E.D. Va. 2018).
44
See, e.g., Grimm, 302 F.Supp. 3d at 737–38.
45
Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined
Out of Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administrationsex-definition.html.
46
Id.
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the legal definition of sex could be translated to the
equal protection context and would implicate questions of the
appropriate reference classes.
Were the courts to move forward with these new proposed
bases for classification—like non-binary status or transgender
status—courts would have to consider whether to delineate them
separately or to include them in the already established areas of
sex or sexual orientation. If defined separately, governmental
classifications on these bases would likely only be analyzed under
rational basis review because the Court infrequently recognizes
new suspect classifications.47 Rational basis review provides very
little protection to the challenger and requires a finding of
animus—no rational legislative purpose—to be struck down.48
If these classifications were included in current gender
jurisprudence, the legal inequalities of those groups would be
subsumed into those of women; while there are still inequalities
between men and women, the issues, both legal and cultural, faced
by gender non-binary individuals are distinct from those faced by
women.49 Additionally, a transgender woman may identify as a
woman and not necessarily as transgender; would this exclude her
from a so-called “transgender” class?
Nor do transgender
individuals, while included in the LGBT acronym, necessarily
have the same concerns as those who identify as lesbian, gay,
or bisexual.50 Recent litigation pertaining to LGB individuals
focused on marriage equality, whereas transgender individuals
face discrimination in the workplace, housing, school, healthcare,
etc.51 As a result, some transgender activists call for dissociating
47
The last recognition of a suspect classification was nonmarital child status in
1988. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
48
However, for cases where laws were struck down under rational basis review,
see supra text accompanying note 3.
49
See Nikki Graff, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent,
Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts (recognizing a wage gap of around 18% between
men and women); see also Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley
Sweetland Edwards, The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-theyear-2017-silence-breakers (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (recognizing the leaders of the
#MeToo movement as Time people of the year).
50
See Alexandra Bolles, 5 of the Most Unsettling Realities for America’s Trans
Community, GLAAD (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.glaad.org/blog/5-most-unsettlingrealities-americas-trans-community.
51
Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03, 2608 (2015)
(recognizing same-sex marriage as a right protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause), with National
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transgender individuals from the LGBT acronym, and the ACLU
has a separate category for transgender issues within LGBT rights
on its website.52
Gender identity is also distinct from sexual orientation: if a
transgender woman also identifies as a lesbian, into which “class”
would she be properly categorized?53
These complicated
intersections highlight the conflict between individual identity
and governmental classifications. Intersectionality, introduced by
Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 to describe the unique disadvantages
of black women, refers to the “overlapping and interdependent
systems of discrimination or disadvantage.”54 Legislation seeks to
work with a set of broad-based facts and, in doing so, may often
gloss over individual experiences.
Further, many gender identities are poorly defined or
have overlapping definitions.55 For example, there may not
be a meaningful distinction between genderfluidity and
genderqueerness.56 Even if so, these are arguably not distinctions
that should be parsed by justices in trying to carve out new
protected classes.57 The proliferation of gender identities raises
Transgender Discrimination Survey: Full Report, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY (Sept. 11, 2012), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/national-trans
gender-discrimination-survey-full-report.
52
See Katie Glover, Why It’s Time to Take the T out of LGBT, INDEPENDENT (Sept.
10, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-its-time-to-take-the-t-out-oflgbt-10493352.html; LGBT Rights, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/lgbt-rights.
53
Carla Moleiro & Nuna Pinto, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Review
of Concepts, Controversies, and Their Relation to Psychopathology Classification
Systems, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (2015) (asserting that sexual orientation and gender
identity are distinct).
54
Intersectionality, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/429843 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019); see also Merrill Perlman, The Origin of the
Term ‘Intersectionality’, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.cjr.
org/language_corner/intersectionality.php.
55
See supra notes 23–28 for a discussion of definitions of different gender
identities.
56
See supra notes 24 and 26, specifically highlighting the ambiguities and overlap
in these two definitions.
57
This accords with ideas of judicial restraint. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Roberts
Emphasizes High Court’s Restraint, Independence, WASHINGTON POST (May 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-says-independence
-and-restraint-should-be-high-courts-guiding-lights/2016/05/07/c42fdf5c-139d-11e68967-7ac733c56f12_story.html?noredirect=on. Additionally, judges may be more
biased than the general public in cases where traditional gender roles are challenged.
See Judges as Susceptible to Gender Bias as Laypeople—and Sometimes More So,
SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/
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the question of the stopping point: would each individual gender
identity require its own suspect class recognition? In sum, it
is likely improper for a judge to reject an individual’s
self-identification and impose his own conception of what that
individual’s gender might be.
Courts defer to self-identified characteristics in some areas of
constitutional jurisprudence, including religion.58
In cases
implicating the Free Exercise Clause, courts do not inquire into
veracity of beliefs, but, once determining that they are sincerely
held, deem them valid.59 This underlies the contention that given
the failure of gender as a binary classification, suspect
classification analysis—especially given the Court’s reluctance to
recognize new suspect classes—falls short in considering the new
issues faced with a multiplicity of gender identities.
B. Race
The Supreme Court recognized race and national origin as
suspect bases for classification in 1944.60 The Equal Protection
Clause aimed to protect newly-freed African Americans as one of
the post-Civil War Reconstruction amendments.61 In the first
definition of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Slaughter-House
Cases characterized its “pervading purpose” as “the freedom of the
slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
180419141541.htm (discussing Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate
Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY
SCI. (2018)).
58
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184–85 (1965).
59
Id. (“Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because
they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’ Their task is to decide whether the beliefs
professed by a registrant are sincerely held . . . . This is the threshold question of
sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”).
60
Korematsu v. United States stated that while classifications based on race are
not per se unconstitutional, courts must subject them to “the most rigid scrutiny.” 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality.”).
61
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). John Bingham, the
amendment’s principal drafter, said the following:
No state ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to
any freemen the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or
immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have
assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy.
Lambert Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers’
Understanding: The Case of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 45
(1996) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866)).
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and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him.”62 This paternalistic attitude towards people
of color persisted into the 1950s, when most of the race-based
classification cases were decided.63 At this time, race was
frequently understood by the general public to have a biological
basis, despite contrary statements by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”).64
The massive pushback against Brown v. Board of Education and
the continued existence of anti-miscegenation laws underscored
the conception that black people were widely considered
biologically inferior to white people.65 Many, including the trial
court judge in Loving v. Virginia—the case striking down
anti-miscegenation statutes as violating the Equal Protection
Clause—continued to believe the two races should not mix in
schools or in marriages.66
While race relations in the United States are still fraught
with tension, the country’s popular conception of race has
changed dramatically.67 There is consensus among the biological,
anthropological, and sociological academic communities that race
is a social construct with no biological basis.68 Race raises a
62

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 635–36 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637,
642 (1950).
64
Robert Wald Sussman, There Is No Such Thing as Race, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8,
2014, 3:01 P.M.), https://www.newsweek.com/there-no-such-thing-race-283123.
65
The governor of Arkansas ordered the Arkansas National Guard to stand
shoulder to shoulder to prevent admitted black students from entering the newly
desegregated school. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
66
388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The
fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix.” (quoting the trial court opinion)). Possible governmental purposes for
anti-miscegenation statutes were to “ ‘preserve the racial integrity of its citizens’, and
to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration
of racial pride.’ ” Id. at 7.
67
See, e.g., Andrew Arenge, Stephanie Perry & Dartunorro Clark, Poll: 64 Percent
of Americans Say Racism Remains a Major Problem, NBC NEWS (May 29, 2018, 4:44
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-64-percent-americans-sayracism-remains-major-problem-n877536; see also German Lopez, There are Huge
Racial Disparities in How US Police Use Force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:12 PM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killings-racismracial-disparities.
68
See, e.g., Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology is Fiction,
Racism as a Social Problem is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspective on the
63
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reference class question similar to gender, namely how to
define the proper boundaries of a racial group to best facilitate
courts’ analyses. This ambiguity extends to dictionary definitions.
Merriam-Webster defines race as all of the following: “a family,
tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock,” “a class or
kind of people unified by shared interests, habits, or
characteristics,” and “an actually or potentially interbreeding
group within a species.”69
Given that there are no biological distinctions underlying
what we understand as racial groups, there is no valid reason for
classifying individuals on the basis of those groups in the first
place.
However, despite their biological irrelevance, social
constructions of racial groups have arguably become endowed with
independent cultural significance.70 Delineation of racial groups
allows the dominant group to otherize and to justify subjugation
towards minority groups.71 The question of majoritarianism
becomes increasingly complex in light of demographic projections
that white Americans will constitute less than half the
population in 2044; a group of diminishing size may feel
increasingly threatened.72
However, even among social constructions of racial groups,
proper boundaries are difficult to ascertain. For example, the
number of races in the current American cultural context is
ambiguous.73 As of the 2017 census, the United States Census
Bureau demarcated five categories for race: White, Black or
African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and

Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 16 (2005) (“[R]acial
distinctions . . . are not genetically discrete, are not reliably measured, and are not
scientifically meaningful.”).
69
Race, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/race
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
70
See, e.g., Smedley & Smedley, supra note 68.
71
See, e.g., Karen D. Pyke, What Is Internalized Racial Oppression and Why Don’t
We Study It? Acknowledging Racism’s Hidden Injuries, 53 SOC. PERSP. 551,
557 (2010).
72
Sabrina Tavernise, Why the Announcement of a Looming White Minority Makes
Demographers Nervous, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/22/us/white-americans-minority-population.html?emc=edit_rr_20181123&nl=
race-related&nlid=4814983420181123&te=1; see Lauretta Charlton, What Is the
Great Replacement?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html?login=email&auth=login-email
(stating that the rallying cry of the Charlottesville white nationalists was “[y]ou will
not replace us”).
73
See, e.g., About Race, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/topics/population/race/about.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
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Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.74 The Bureau also
permits reporting of more than one race in the census.75 The
Bureau website explains that “[p]eople who identify their origin as
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be of any race,” evincing the
imprecision of measuring race even for census purposes.76
Furthermore, according to the census definition, “White”
includes “[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples
of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.”77 Under this
imprecise rubric, the United States government homogenizes
culturally distinct experiences.78 The experience of a Middle
Eastern or North African (“MENA”) individual in the United
States likely differs significantly from that of someone from
Western Europe.79 This disparate treatment has worsened with
the presidential election of Donald Trump in 2016.80 Additionally,
someone of North African origin may “pass” as black, but
under the current census categories, that individual would be
categorized with white individuals of European origin.
Additionally, Asian and Middle Eastern are two distinct
categories, discounting the fact that the Middle East is a part of
Asia.81 Ostensibly, someone of Middle Eastern descent could be
properly categorized as either Asian or White/MENA. While this
provides only one illustration, the confusion inherent in the
census categories underscores the difficulty of reliably defining
racial groups.
The treatment of mixed-race individuals under the Equal
Protection Clause raises a new set of questions. In Plessy v.
Ferguson, the Court treated an individual who was “of mixed
descent, in the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and

74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe
in the American Dream, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2017), http://www.pewforum.
org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/.
About forty percent of Muslim adults identify as white, including Arabs and people of
Middle Eastern descent. Id.
79
See, e.g., Ibrahim Hooper, CAIR Report: Anti-Muslim Bias Incidents,
Hate-Crimes Spike in Second Quarter of 2018, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC
RELATIONS (July 12, 2018), https://www.cair.com/cair_report_anti_muslim_bias_
incidents_hate_crimes_spike_in_second_quarter_of_2018.
80
Id.
81
The Regions of Asia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Asia/The-regions-of-Asia (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
75
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one-eighth African blood” as black.82 However, the racial identity
of a mixed-race person may differ significantly from that of
someone who more visibly belongs to a historically disadvantaged
minority.83 Mixed-race Americans with one white parent may
also identify culturally as white rather than as a member of
the minority group.84 Additionally, according to Pew Research
Center, more than a quarter of Asian people and Hispanic
people marry outside of their race, which will lead to a higher
percentage of mixed-race individuals in the United States in the
coming decades.85
These analyses of gender and race emphasize the need to shift
the focus of equal protection analysis from classes to individuals.
The failure to classify gender and race as discrete, consistently
definable classes—if they ever were—requires a court, in
determining whether the basis for governmental classifications is
indeed proper, to consider the individual at issue, rather than a
purported class to which the individual may belong.
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE
The issues delineated above underscore the need for a
new framework for equal protection jurisprudence, one not
predicated on defined classes. The Supreme Court itself seems to
recognize this need whenever it does not adhere to the
three-tiered framework and instead engages in results-oriented
decision-making.86 Consequently, instead of urging the Court to
increase the number of suspect classifications and to articulate a
level of scrutiny for each, this framework urges that a balancing
test should be employed, with candor, on a case-by-case basis.87 In
each case where the Equal Protection Clause is implicated, a court
should weigh government interests against individual interests.88
82

163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
Tavernise, supra note 72.
84
Id.
85
Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the United States 50
Years After Loving v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pew
socialtrends.org/2017/05/18/1-trends-and-patterns-in-intermarriage/.
86
See supra text accompanying note 3.
87
Only race, national origin, alienage, gender, and nonmarital children constitute
suspect or quasi-suspect classes. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208
(2016); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456, 461 (1988); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
88
Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens advocated balancing tests
in equal protection jurisprudence. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970)
83
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This framework applies to any court hearing an equal protection
claim, whether in the first instance, on appeal, or on writ of
certiorari. If the government’s interest is found to be weightier
than the individual interest, the government would prevail, and
vice versa.
A.

Government Interest

The government interest side of the balancing test resembles
current equal protection jurisprudence: it would consider the
government’s purpose and how well the challenged classification
fits with, or accomplishes, that purpose.89
The government must present an intelligible purpose. Unlike
existing rational basis review, where the burden is on the
challenger and the reviewing court will impute purpose, the
government must provide an intelligible and valid purpose to the
court.90 A purpose is invalid if it is grounded in animus. “Animus,”
as defined by the Supreme Court, is the “bare . . . desire to
harm.”91 Moreno frames animus in terms of harming a “politically
unpopular group”; however, animus can be directed at an
individual, both in the class of one context and the notion of
harming a person based on a characteristic that reflects his
membership in a politically unpopular group.92
A reviewing court should not accept the government’s
statement of purpose as valid on its face: the court must consider
the law’s purpose ascertain whether the legislature was driven by
animus in creating it. The government’s proffered purpose also

(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court should balance “the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification”); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“What class
is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our
laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
89
See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (articulating the use of purpose and fit in
the context of strict scrutiny analysis as “purpose or interest is both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary . . . to
the accomplishment of its purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
(“Moreover, it may be deemed important to effective regulation that the eye doctor be
restricted to geographical locations that reduce the temptations of commercialism.”).
91
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
92
See id.; see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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should not be a post hoc rationalization of purpose.93 To the extent
possible, the proffered purpose must be the actual purpose. If the
government’s purpose is invalid, the government would
automatically lose.
If the government’s purpose is valid and intelligible, a court
would next analyze fit—how well the challenged law effectuates
the proffered interest. A court would choose among the existing
categories to evaluate fit.
The categories are as follows:
(1) necessary to achieve the interest, (2) substantially related to
the interest, (3) rationally related to the interest, and (4) of no
relation to the interest.94 Fit informs whether the classification
drawn by the law is overinclusive, underinclusive, or both
over- and underinclusive. The legislature need not draw its
classifications with “mathematical nicety.”95
However, the
more narrowly tailored the classification, the more likely the
legislature is to be effectuating its actual purpose without relying
on stereotypes or over-generalizations.96 The more tailored
the fit is to the purpose, the more weight is given to the
government’s interest.
B. Individual Interest
The individual interest side of the balancing test employs a
multi-factor test. This multi-factor test evaluates the individual
characteristic upon which the government’s classification is based.
For example, if a law restricted open service by transgender
individuals in the military, gender identity would be the
appropriate reference characteristic. Using this framework, a
court would both draw on the factors courts have historically
evaluated in determining whether a suspect classification exists
and apply additional factors.97 Crucially, a court need not identify
93
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The justification must
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”).
94
See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
95
Lindsley v. Nat’l Carbonic Gas, Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1920).
96
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The Court considered the breadth of the disability
imposed by the classification as probative of whether it was valid. Id.
97
In determining the existence of a suspect classification, courts have
extrapolated from footnote 4 of United States vs. Carolene Products. 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends to seriously curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
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a suspect classification implicating every individual with that
characteristic. This would provide a more flexible standard for
courts to apply. The list of factors is not necessarily exhaustive;
however, a court would primarily rely on the factors articulated
here and logical outgrowths of those factors that may be
particularly applicable in a given case.
The proposed factors are as follows, framed with reference to
the individual characteristic upon which the classification is
based: (1) Has the government historically discriminated against
people with this characteristic, or is this kind of government action
a “new”—within the last few decades—discrimination against
people with this characteristic? (2) Does this characteristic have
no impact on the individual’s ability to contribute to society? (3) Is
the characteristic immutable? (4) Does the characteristic cause
the individual to be distant from the political process? (5) Is the
characteristic visible? (6) Is the government imposing a burden on
the individual in classifying on the basis of this characteristic?
(7) Does the characteristic lack comprehensive statutory
protections? (8) Does the infringed right have a close nexus to
protected constitutional rights? (9) Does the right being infringed
upon cause a highly burdensome deprivation to the individual?
The factors are listed in roughly decreasing order of
importance; consequently, a court should accord more weight to
the factors higher on the list. The more factors present, the more
weight given to the individual interest. However, there is no level
of mathematical precision as to the factors’ relative weight. In
past decisions, no single factor has been dispositive in recognizing
a suspect class, but the presence of any one factor indicates the
classification is “more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective.” 98
However, courts have particularly
emphasized history of discrimination and the characteristic’s
relation to the individual’s ability to function in society.99

correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). Consequently, courts consider
history of discrimination, immutability, and distance from the political process. See,
e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973).
98
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
99
See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–86
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (expanding on the principles of suspect class recognition from Plyler
v. Doe); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432–35 (Conn. 2008).
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK
A.

Justifications for the Individual Interest Factors

This section explains the inclusion of each of the factors
relating to individual interests described above. History of
discrimination gets to the heart of the equal protection inquiry:
that the government classified based on this characteristic for
invalid reasons and in light of past maltreatment suggesting
unfounded antipathy.100
Conversely, in terms of “new”
discrimination, governmental discrimination need not be
centuries-long to be disabling on a class; an example is
discrimination, including by the Trump administration, against
transgender individuals.101
If the characteristic has no bearing on the individual’s ability
to contribute in society, the government is likely invalid in
employing it because “legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility.”102 In terms of immutability, are
sexual orientation and gender identity immutable? While an
individual can transition to another gender, which would seem to
imply mutability, identification as the gender to which the
individual transitioned is immutable. A court would need to
grapple with these questions and take into account scientific
evidence to determine whether this factor is present. Distance
from the political process undergirded the Court’s decision in
Romer v. Evans, where LGB individuals needed to amend the state
constitution rather than merely pass a law to disable
discrimination against them.103 Moreover, courts need to step in
and be more scrutinizing when the political process is not a viable

100
See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (“There can be no doubt that our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”).
101
See, e.g., Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10–13
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
102
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); see, e.g., Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (recognizing the imposition of penalties on an
“illegitimate child” is illogical and unjust because the penalties have no relation to the
child’s individual responsibility or wrongdoing).
103
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“Homosexuals are forbidden the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without restraint. They can obtain specific
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend
the State Constitution . . . .”).
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vehicle to effect change. If the characteristic is visible, it is more
likely that manifesting this disfavored characteristic will
detrimentally impact the individual.104
Considering whether a burden is imposed elevates the
individual interest if the classification is not beneficent.105
Current affirmative action jurisprudence treats beneficent
classifications the same as invidious classifications; specifically in
the context of race, this reflects the view that any use of race is
problematic.106 However, if equal protection jurisprudence seeks
to “ ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race,” this factor gives some
deference to the government in using race in a beneficent way,
particularly if the means are narrowly tailored as evaluated on the
governmental interest side of the analysis.107 The Court, in its
current jurisprudence, considers statutory overlay as probative of
political process access; statutes also provide extraconstitutional
protections against governmental or private discrimination on the
basis of the characteristic that would allow a court to defer to
the legislature.108
Whether the right being infringed upon has a close nexus
to protected rights in the Constitution relates to the fundamental
interest portion of equal protection analysis.
Under this
framework, the Court would not have to recognize a fundamental
interest that applies to every case moving forward but would
evaluate the right on a case-by-case basis. If the right is
enumerated in the Constitution or has a close nexus to protected

104
Compare Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted
that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . .”), with Mathews, 427
U.S. at 505–06 (“Moreover, while the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an
inferior position relative to the legitimate . . . perhaps in part because illegitimacy
does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal
and political discrimination against women and Negroes.”).
105
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (limiting jury
service to white males over twenty-one).
106
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“But there can be no doubt that racial
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as
any other form of discrimination.”).
107
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (1995) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
108
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985);
Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976).
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rights, it is more likely to warrant heightened protection.109
Finally, if the extent of the individual’s deprivation is severe,
the court should take this into account and elevate the
individual interest.110
B. Justifications for the Framework as a Whole
This section seeks to justify the framework on a macro level.
First, balancing tests exist in other areas of constitutional
law, particularly procedural due process. The applicable test for
procedural due process from Mathews v. Eldridge balances the
individual interest and the added value of the process sought
against the government’s interest.111 While it is true that
procedural due process claims differ from equal protection claims,
the Mathews test shows courts are willing and able to engage
in balancing in the constitutional context.112 If anything, this
proposed framework provides more guidance to courts than the
Mathews test by listing factors courts should consider. More
generally, individual interest versus government interest is
always the fundamental inquiry in the individual rights arena of
constitutional law. When considering the right of free exercise, to
bear arms, or to exercise one’s parental rights, courts inquire into

109

See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008)
(recognizing voting as a fundamental right undergirding all other Constitutional
protections); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (tying the right to
contraception for unmarried persons to the right of privacy).
110
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) (where depriving undocumented
children of the right to education, while not a fundamental right, would impose an
“inestimable toll” on the children throughout their lives).
111
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”).
112
Procedural due process claims typically entail considering the nature of the
property or liberty interest involved and the degree of deprivation, the cost to the
government in employing additional procedures, and the reliability of existing and
proposed procedures. See id. Mathews and Goldberg v. Kelly juxtapose the need for a
pre-termination hearing for the loss of Social Security benefits and welfare benefits,
respectively. Id. at 323; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
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whether the government is sufficiently justified in curtailing that
individual right.113 For equal protection, the right at issue is to be
treated equally to those similarly situated.114
Additionally, to mitigate concerns about judicial activism,
this framework does not require a court to recognize suspect
classifications or fundamental rights. Because recognizing a
suspect classification or fundamental right triggers heightened
scrutiny, the outcome is weighted against the government;
conversely, in rational basis review, the outcome is weighted
in favor of the government.115 The existence of a suspect
classification or fundamental interest essentially disables
classification on that basis in any situation, including in ways that
may be valid. Furthermore, one case may be insufficient to
determine whether a classification always merits heightened
scrutiny. Based on the particular facts of a given case, the
classification may not seem to warrant heightened scrutiny;
however, this should not foreclose the possibility that heightened
scrutiny may properly be employed in a different context. 116 On
the other hand, the situation in a particular case may evince the
need for heightened scrutiny, but the Court may be unwilling to
extend that protection comprehensively.117
These inherent factual discrepancies underscore the merits of
case-by-case consideration, something courts have done before.
For example, nonmarital child status is recognized as a
quasi-suspect classification meriting intermediate scrutiny, and
classifications among them are evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.118
While immutable and unrelated to individual
responsibility, status as a nonmarital child does not “carry an
obvious badge” in the same way that race and gender do, and,
consequently, the discrimination has never reached the same
113
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. 682, 701 (2014) (right
of free exercise); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (right to bear
arms); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (parental rights).
114
“The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.’ ” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (quoting F.S. Royser Guano Co. v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
115
See supra text accompanying note 1.
116
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1976) (finding a valid
link between age and physical preparedness for police officers).
117
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50
(1985) (where classifying on the basis of intellectual disability was impermissible
in the context of zoning for a group home, but the Court refused to recognize a
protected class).
118
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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level.119 Therefore, courts consider laws that provide a benefit to
some nonmarital children but not to others on a case-by-case
basis.120 In this way, courts look within the classification at the
specific individuals in that class to determine if the use of the
classification is justified.121
Additionally, while cabined to one case, the Supreme Court
recognized a “class of one” as giving rise to a valid Equal Protection
Clause claim—that a plaintiff need not belong to a preordained
class for individualized and arbitrary governmental treatment to
be unlawful.122 The text of the Fourteenth Amendment further
supports the notion that belonging to a class is not a precondition
for an equal protection claim: it details, in relevant part,
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws,” which suggests that the
individual is the focus rather than the group.123 Furthermore, the
text does not mention classifications, protected classes, or
fundamental interests.124
On balance, this framework, in practice, identifies animus.125
The prevention of classifications based on a bare desire to harm is
the most basic purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.126 Animus
holdings, while subject to criticism on other grounds, have the
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Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261 (1978) (analyzing a statute requiring
illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers to provide evidence of
acknowledgement of paternity during the father’s lifetime); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974) (analyzing a statute that allows illegitimate children who
lived with a disabled parent or received support prior to disability to receive benefits).
121
See supra text accompanying note 36.
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Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563–64 (2000) (where the village
required a thirty-three-foot easement to connect the plaintiff to municipal water
supply, when it only required a fifteen-foot easement for those similarly situated).
“Class of one” claims do not apply to government employees. Enquist v. Or. Dep’t of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008).
123
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
124
Id.
125
See infra Part IV for application of the framework.
126
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“For if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).
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merits of being narrow.127 The Court has relied on animus in other
areas of constitutional law, most recently in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.128
The Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court found antireligious hostility based on the
comments of two commissioners that were disparaging towards
religion and from the commission’s disparate treatment of
religious and nonreligious claimants.129 Masterpiece Cakeshop
speaks to the proposition that rights-restricting government
action is unconstitutional if predicated on bad intentions.130 It
remains to be seen how prevalent animus-based decisions will be
after the departure of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the
majority opinions in the animus-based decisions of Romer,
Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell, and Masterpiece Cakeshop.131
This framework essentially advocates for equity judging.
Equity means equality as fairness, rather than equality as
sameness: it is the idea that the government cannot treat one
individual differently from another without justifiable reasons.
What constitutes justifiable reasons may vary from one judge to
another, which this framework recognizes as possibly leading to
disparate outcomes by jurisdiction. This does not mean that
judges should be activists: on the contrary, this framework erases
the need for judges to be protectionist towards groups that may
constitute large swaths of the population. Some judges believe
race is unique in the American context—that the Fourteenth
Amendment protections were created in the context of “that race
and that emergency,” and the political process sufficiently protects
any other purported discrete and insular minorities.132 This
framework rejects the notion that race should be treated
differently at the outset than any other classification, as well as
the slippery slope argument presented in Cleburne that
recognizing intellectual disability as a suspect classification would
also require recognition of “the aging, the disabled, the mentally
127
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155,
171–73 (2019) (“A foundational critique of the animus idea maintains that it reflects
accusations of ill will and subjective prejudice . . . . [T]his critique suggests that the
animus idea reflects a type of ‘Manichean’ thinking that divides the world into saints
(who reject views labelled as animus-driven) and sinners (who embrace such views).”).
128
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018).
129
Id. at 1729, 1731.
130
Id. at 1731.
131
Id. at 1723; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 748 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
132
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).

2019]

SHEDDING TIERS

1259

ill, and the infirm.”133 The fear of over-constitutionalizing the
Equal Protection Clause is that any class towards whom the
government may have had an intimation of malice is now subject
to strict scrutiny analysis, and the government is thus dissuaded
from legislating as to that group, even in ways that might have
been legitimate.134 The problems raised in Cleburne stem from the
Court’s own admission that it needed to “look to the likelihood that
governmental action premised on a particular classification is
valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case
before us.”135
The separation of powers and the proper role of the courts
underlie much of equal protection jurisprudence. Rational basis
scrutiny seeks to defer to the political branches by assuming that
classifications are proper in the vast majority of situations.136
Based on this logic, judges should only abandon deference for laws
that implicate discrete and insular minorities.137 The argument
against recognition of suspect classifications is predicated
on deference to the political process—that the political branches
should decide these questions, not the judiciary.138
This
framework, which removes the need to recognize suspect
classifications, furthers these goals of judicial minimalism. While
it may seem like a drastic departure from current equal protection
jurisprudence, as demonstrated in the next section, the outcomes
under this new framework would often be the same as in
employing the tiers of scrutiny.139
133

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
Id. at 444 (“Even assuming that many of these laws could be shown to be
substantially related to an important governmental purpose, merely requiring
the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting
at all.”).
135
Id. at 446.
136
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
137
See supra text accompanying note 97.
138
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—
power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government.”); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the Constitution of the
United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal
democratic means . . . .”); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (Powell,
J., concurring) (“It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a
major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.”) (arguing that it was
unnecessary for the court to recognize gender as a suspect class because the Equal
Rights Amendment was up for ratification by the states and would resolve that
very question).
139
See infra Part IV.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
A.

Retrospective Example

This example mirrors the facts of Massachusetts v. Murgia,
where Massachusetts enacted a law requiring state police officers
to retire at the age of fifty.140 The challenger, Robert Murgia, was
a former officer of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts
State Police.141 In furtherance of its policy, the police department
required that uniformed officers over the age of forty pass a more
rigorous annual examination, including an electrocardiogram and
tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding.142 Murgia was in excellent
physical and mental health and passed his physical examination
four months before his mandatory retirement.143
The governmental interests are as follows. The purpose
proffered by the government is protection of the public by “physical
preparedness of its uniformed police.”144
The government
specifically cited the duties of uniformed officers—including those
to “participate in controlling prison and civil disorders, respond to
emergencies and natural disasters, patrol highways in marked
cruisers, investigate crime, apprehend criminal suspects, and
provide backup support for local law enforcement personnel”—as
evidence of the need for physical preparedness.145 This purpose is
intelligible, within the exercise of the state’s police powers, and
appears to be valid. It does not seem to be driven by animus based
on age, given that there is a link between age and physical
preparedness.146
The fit is substantially related. Forcing police officers to retire
at a certain age is not the least restrictive way to effectuate
readiness of the police force, given that individualized
assessments could be done, which was the remedy that Murgia
sought.147 However, it does serve generally to keep officers who
might be in worse physical shape off of the force, and age is
correlated with physical decline—“risk of physical failure,
140

Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308 (1976).
Id. at 309.
142
Id. at 311.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 314.
145
Id. at 310.
146
Id. at 310–11 (“[E]ven (appellee’s) experts concede that there is a general
relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond to the
demands of the job.”).
147
Id. at 316.
141
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particularly in the cardiovascular system, increases with age,
and . . . the number of individuals in a given age group incapable
of performing stress functions increases with the age of the
group.”148 This makes the fit more than rationally related and rise
to the level of substantially related.
The individual interests are as follows. There is some
discrimination against the elderly, but not a history of purposeful
discrimination.149 There is a relationship between age and ability
to function in society, particularly if function here is narrowly
defined as service in the police force.150 Age is an immutable
characteristic; one has no control over one’s age, and everyone
experiences aging.151 Age is visible, but being elderly is not a
disfavored visible characteristic in the same way as are race or
gender. Further, age itself does not cause distance from the
political process.152 The government is imposing a burden, not
conferring a benefit, in considering age in this way. Additionally,
age does have statutory protections under federal law, including
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.153 As to the
right being infringed upon, there may be a property interest in
continued government employment.154 For there to be a property
interest, the court considers the nature of the interest, whether
there is a mutual understanding by the parties, and whether
there is an extraconstitutional source of the interest.155 The
deprivation—mandatory loss of a job—is highly burdensome to
the individual, and it is more difficult to find a job at a more
advanced age.156
148

Id. at 311.
Id. at 313 (“While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons . . . have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful
unequal treatment’ . . . .”).
150
See id. at 310–11.
151
Id. at 313–14 (“[I]t marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span.”).
152
The average age of House members in the 115th Congress was 57.8 years
and 61.8 years for Senators. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE (2018), https://www.senate.gov/CR
Spubs/b8f6293e-c235-40fd-b895-6474d0f8e809.pdf.
153
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325; see also 29 U.S.C § 623 (2018) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
154
Compare Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), with Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
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See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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Murgia, 427 U.S. at 323 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“While depriving any
government employee of his job is a significant deprivation, it is particularly
burdensome when the person deprived is an older citizen.”).
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The fact that there is a statutory scheme to protect against
age discrimination, while not typically dispositive, would counsel
in favor of the government prevailing. Additionally, this is a case
in which there is a viable reason—in fact, a good reason—for the
government to classify on the basis of age. There is a public
interest in having a competent police force, and limiting the age of
police officers does serve to effectuate that outcome.
Consequently, it seems, in this case, that the court should rule in
favor of the government, given the relative tightness of fit and lack
of individual interest factors.
B. Prospective Example
This example considers the transgender military ban from
Karnoski v. Trump. This is analyzed from the perspective of a
hypothetical individual plaintiff who was injured by the ban.
President Obama lifted the ban on transgender military service in
2016; transgender individuals were never statutorily proscribed
from military service, unlike gay and lesbian servicemembers who
were precluded from service by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.157 However,
in July 2017, President Trump announced on Twitter that the
United States would no longer “accept or allow” transgender
people “to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.”158
Transgender people, for the purposes of the ban, includes people
“with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria . . . [and those]
who require or have undergone gender transition.”159 The Trump
administration’s policy has been enjoined by four federal district
courts.160 The Supreme Court subsequently granted defendants’
application for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending
appeal; the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal in June 2019 and
found the class of transgender servicemembers merited
intermediate scrutiny based on an analogy to gender and

157
Emma Margolin, With Transgender Military Ban Lifted, Obama Cements
Historic LGBT Rights Legacy, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/transgender-military-ban-lifted-obama-cements-historic-lgbt-rightslegacy-n600541.
158
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 13, 2018). There have been a number of iterations of the ban since the original
2017 declaration; however, the ban referred to in this Note is the 2017 Twitter
Announcement and subsequent memorandum. Id.
159
Id. at *3.
160
Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1.
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deference to military decision-making.161 It also emphasized the
importance of as-applied reasoning, underscoring the merits of a
case-by-case approach.162
The governmental interests are as follows. The government’s
proffered purpose is that transgender individuals could
“undermine readiness . . . and impose an unreasonable burden
on the military.”163 Increased administrative cost and the
conservation of scarce resources may be an intelligible purpose.164
However, there is a real possibility that this is driven by animus,
given the Trump administration’s treatment of transgender
individuals.165 The fit is rationally related to the purpose of
limiting costs, as banning transgender individuals effectuates the
military’s purpose of not providing gender dysphoria-related
treatment to transgender service members. However, banning
those individuals entirely without any particularized
consideration is far from the least restrictive means to effectuate
that end, and exclusion, as a remedy, is not narrowly tailored.
The individual interests are as follows. There is “new”
discrimination against people with this characteristic, particularly
from the Trump administration since President Trump took office
in January 2017.166 There is no relationship between being
transgender and an individual’s ability to contribute to society; the
plaintiff would be a transgender individual who voluntarily seeks
to serve the country through military service—an extraordinary
contribution to society.167 However, gender dysphoria is still
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Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1200 (“[A]n as-applied approach ‘is the preferred course of adjudication
since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments.’ ” (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
447 (1985))).
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Trump Signs New Transgender Military Ban, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43525549.
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See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
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The Justice Department also informed “the Supreme Court that businesses
can discriminate against workers based on their gender identity without violating
federal law.” Chris Opfer, DOJ: Businesses Can Discriminate Against Transgender
Workers, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/justice-department-says-transgender-discrimination-is-lawful.
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Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 13, 2018) (detailing the history of discrimination against transgender people,
including “endemic levels of physical and sexual violence, harassment, and
discrimination in employment, education, housing, criminal justice, and access to
health care”).
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Id. (“Indeed, the Individual Plaintiffs in this case contribute not only to society
as a whole, but to the military specifically. For years, they have risked their lives
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included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”), including DSM-V, the most recent iteration.168
Transgender identity may or may not be visible, depending on the
stage of transition or whether the individual has chosen to
transition. The characteristic, based on medical consensus, is
immutable.169 Transgender identity also causes distance from the
political process, if gauged by the size of the group and its
representation in legislatures.170 The transgender population is
less than one percent of the nation’s population, and there are
no openly transgender members of Congress or the federal
judiciary.171
The right to serve in the military is not
constitutionally enumerated but is considered a civic duty.172 The
deprivation of not being able to serve in armed forces, particularly
if the individual was already serving in the military, is highly
burdensome to the individual.173 The government is imposing a
burden in considering this characteristic by refusing to allow the
individual’s service in the military. There are no statutory
protections for transgender individuals in the military, except,
perhaps, in the area of workplace discrimination.174
Title
VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin.175 If transgender identity is
found to be included within the meaning of “sex,” this protection
might apply.176

serving in combat and non-combat roles, fighting terrorism around the world, and
working to secure the safety and security of our forces overseas.”).
168
What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.
org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria
(last
updated
Feb. 2016).
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Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10 (“Experts agree that gender identity has a
‘biological component,’ and there is a ‘medical consensus that gender identity is
deep-seated, set early in life, and impervious to external influences.’ ”).
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See id. at *11.
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See id.
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See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(characterizing military service as a “fundamental civic obligation”).
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See supra Section IV.A for discussion of property interests under the
Constitution.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
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Id.
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See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–75, cert. granted (6th Cir. 2018) (finding gender identity-based
discrimination actionable under Title VII). The Supreme Court has heard arguments
in this case and will decide it this term.

2019]

SHEDDING TIERS

1265

Even if the transgender military ban did not automatically fail
as based on animus, the individual would likely prevail.
Administrative cost, while an intelligible purpose, is not
particularly significant when weighed against the myriad
individual interests implicated, and a total ban is far from a
narrowly tailored way to achieve that objective. Consequently, in
weighing the governmental interests against the individual
interests, the individual would succeed in an equal protection
challenge to the ban.
CONCLUSION
The Equal Protection Clause seeks to ensure that the
government treats similarly situated persons similarly. However,
current equal protection jurisprudence falls short due to the
breakdown of the classes on which government classifications are
predicated. Gender and race are not understood the same way
today as when they were recognized as suspect classifications;
using those classes today is limiting and fails to consider changes
in scientific attitudes and public perception.
Consequently, courts should no longer engage in suspect
classification analysis to determine whether a suspect class merits
heightened scrutiny and should instead reorient focus towards the
individual who manifests the characteristic upon which the
classification is based. This requires eliminating the tiers of
scrutiny, as no suspect classification would trigger a heightened
form of scrutiny in every case. As Justice John Paul Stevens said,
“There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State
to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply
one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in
other cases.”177
In this vein, the framework suggested by this Note balances
the government’s interest against the individual interest on a
case-by-case basis. While it may seem like a drastic departure
from current equal protection jurisprudence, as demonstrated in
the application section, the outcomes under this new framework
would often be the same as under the tiered framework. However,
this new framework no longer relies on outdated classifications
and recognizes the Court’s unwillingness to recognize new suspect
classifications, as doing so often results in the Court being accused
of policymaking. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has engaged in
177

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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equity judging and de facto balancing in the past. This framework
engages in that same balancing—but with openness and frankness
to preserve the integrity of the Court’s reputation—and does not
serve as a complete upending of precedent.

